Contradictory Definitions on Torture?

Tell that to the Holy See!

A reader brings this to my attention:

Thanks for fighting the good fight on your blog and at Mark Shea's blog
on the torture issue.

Thought you might be interested to see this:

http://web.archive.org/web/20050210092221/http://www.holyseemission.org/26jun2002.html

He's referring to my post on torture and Catholic Teaching and some comments on Mark Shea's post that references my work.

One commenter, in his ongoing effort to prove the necessity of clear definitions of torture, has proclaimed that two of the definitions I offer contradict one another.

What I have done however, is to show that significantly different conclusions result from apparently similar definitions. These different conclusions then lead us to dramatically different interpretations of the truth which are incompatible.

This is not sophistry. This is simple logic. Prove the logic wrong and you are arguing fairly. Argue against solid logic, and you are arguing in a sophistical manner.

I do not think my soul is in danger yet. My spiritual director does not think so. I received communion this morning in good conscience. I do not think torture is moral. Nor do I think abuse is moral. I do not think slander is either.

Be that as it may, my only argument is this, that solid definitions lead to solid conclusions. Poor definitions lead to poor conclusions.

The logical conclusion of Doubting Thomas' position is that we can't say whether or not certain actions qualify as torture. After all, we don't have a clear definition.

Now, pardon my cynicism, but his argument strikes me as sophistry. Why? He's manipulating his premises by rhetorical sleight-of-hand. How's that? Let's take a closer look at his own argument:

Mark,
Going to the link you posted, I now take this as the definition of torture that I will use:

"any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions."

As such, the actions at Abu Ghraib were not torture as they did not take place with "the consent of a public official acting in an official capacity." We know this because those involved were punished. Rather, what they were guilty of was abuse.
Please refrain, per the definition you yourself reference, from equating Abu Ghraib with torture again.

First of all, I offered these definitions as references that intelligent people could use to understand torture. Nowhere did I say that anyone had to use each definition literally. I take it that Doubting Thomas is an intelligent person. Therefore, he can use these definitions as references to understand torture. Instead, he uses two offered definitions to make some ridiculous point about how definitions can contradict each other, rendering the truth unknowable:

Definition 1 per Mark's post:Something causing severe pain or anguish

Definition 2 per Mark's post:

any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions

Syllogism per Def. 1:
Torture is anything that causes sever pain.
What went on at Abu Ghraib caused severe pain.
Therefore what went on at Abu Ghraib was torture.

Syllogism per Def. 2:

Torture is what is sanctioned by the state.
What went on at Abu Ghraib was not sanctioned by the state.
Therefore what went on at Abu Ghraib was not torture.

Axiom per Aristotle:

Something cannot be and not be at the same time.

Application:
Something cannot be torture and not torture at the same time.

Uh Huh.

Where is the rhetorical gymnastics of which I spoke? It's in how Doubting Thomas interpretes the phrase "when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity." In particular, he focuses on "public official" and "acting in an official capacity." In DT's world, a public official can only act in an official capacity if his action reflects the policy of his superiors.

Having been a Naval officer since 1985, (and now in pasture) I know that when one acts, one is either acting in according with official policy or contrary to it. If one is acting contrary to policy then one's act's are unofficial - outside an official capacity.

He asserts that the policy of the US government does not approve of torture because the US government punished the perpetrators of Abu Ghraib. Therefore, he concludes, those perpetrators could not have acted in an official capacity.

Yeah. That dog will hunt.

DT's problem is that he does not distinguish between licit and illicit action within official capacity. He assumes that all official capacity must be licit or it's not official capacity. Wrong. If the President of the United States sells secrets to a foreign government, his action is still taken within the bounds of his official capacity. His action is illicit, but not suddenly unofficial. That's why the constitution has a provision for removing such a corrupt individual from the office of the Presidency--the impeachment process.

The soldiers at Abu Ghraib committed their otrocities as soldiers of the US military. While their actions were not policy, they were actions undertaken while they were on duty. Therefore, they were actions of public officials. Hence, they tortured prisoners in defiance of Military policy and US law.

When at least two other commenters point out the error in his interpretation, he declares that their positions are equivocations:

Katherine and Seamus have taken one legitimate road to deny the conclusion I draw. This hinges on the equivocation of the term "official capacity."

No, they don't. Kathering and Seamus correctly point out that anyone in an official capacity acts within that capacity whenever they carry out their duties, whether their actions are legal, and moral, or not.

DT's entire conclusion on the contradiction between the definitions of torture that I offered as references rests on his inadequate interpretation of acting within official capacity. Therefore, the contradiction he sees that renders the truth of torture unknowable doesn't exist.

Apparently, the Holy See agrees:

Today, June 26th, the day declared by the United Nations as the “International Day of Support for Victims of Torture,” the Holy See has acceded to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

This Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1984 and entered into force on June 26, 1987. Up until now, it has been ratified by 129 States.

The instrument of accession, signed by Pope John Paul II, was deposited today in the Office of the Treaty Section by H.E. Archbishop Renato R. Martino, Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations, together with an Informative Declaration by which the Holy See explains the scope of its accession. Among other things, this Declaration says:

“The Holy See considers the Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment a valid and ideal tool for the fight against acts that constitute a grave attack on the dignity of the human person. In the contemporary age, the Catholic Church has declared itself constantly in favor of unconditional respect for life itself and has condemned unequivocally ‘everything that violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, physical and mental torture, including psychological coercion’ (Vatican Council II, Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes, December 7, 1965)”.

The Code of Canon Law (1983) as well as the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1992) clearly identify and mention behavior that can hurt the physical or moral integrity of the person. These documents also exhorts leaders and urge the abolition of these acts. Moreover, both Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul II have condemned torture and cruelty against people on several occasions.

The bottom line remains: Catholics must oppose torture. We know what it is; we can develop an intelligent understanding of what it is from the myriad sources that define it. Therefore, we have no excuse not to oppose it. If we stand against abortion and euthanasia because we believe that they are intrinsically evil acts as defined by the Church, then we must oppose torture for the same reason.

The sooner all Fools come to accept this, the better off our society--and the world--will be.